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“Same land, different life”: Under this slogan, Huaming, a mod-
el town in the suburban Dongli District of the municipality of Tianjin, 
China’s fifth-largest city, was presented at the 2010 World Expo in Shang-
hai as a successful example of China’s rural urbanization. The slogan was 
meant to express that the peasants who had to give up their land in the 
process of urbanization and relocate to Huaming were leading better lives 
than before. This is in line with the official portrayal of government-en-
gineered urbanization projects all across the country. However, Western 
journalism and most of academia are painting quite the opposite picture, 
commonly describing a deterioration of people’s lives due to numerous 
problems.
As can be seen from the case of Huaming, there are contradictory nar-
ratives surrounding the consequences that China’s state-led urbanization 
is supposed to have for landless peasants. A narrative essentially is a series 
of nonrandomly connected events that has been constructed to provide 
meaning—whether it appears in propaganda, the media, academic dis-
course, or personal life stories and everyday accounts. Thus, narratives play 
an important role for both world-making and self-making.1
The goal of this article is to critically examine competing narratives 
surrounding China’s state-led urbanization and put them in perspective by 
adopting a “view from below,” i.e., by including landless peasants’ own sto-
ries in the equation. These findings not only allow us to more thoroughly 
discuss China’s urbanization policy and its impact on the people, but also 
prompt us to more consciously reflect on our potential preconceptions. 
In this article, I first provide an overview of the background and gener-
al discourses surrounding China’s state-led rural urbanization. Then, Hua-
ming is introduced as a case study that illustrates the construction of di-
vergent narratives. Finally, I critically question these narratives by drawing 
on data from seven months of ethnographic fieldwork among Huaming’s 
landless peasants.
Building a New Socialist Countryside: Background, 
Promises, and Problems
Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) launched its “Reform and 
Opening-Up” Policy in 1978, the country has urbanized at an unprece-
dented scale and pace. The decollectivization of agriculture, market-ori-
ented reforms, and the loosening of restrictions on internal migration have 
caused millions of surplus rural workers (“migrant workers”) to come to 
cities in search of employment and better lives. At the same time, the econ-
omy has grown, and cities and towns have expanded rapidly into the sur-
rounding countryside. However, as more and more agricultural land has 
been converted to urban construction land, and as many peasants don’t 
pursue farming anymore, urban expansion has led to central government 
concerns over national food security.2
Against the backdrop of the unregulated encroachment of urbaniza-
tion into rural areas on the one hand and “hollow villages” on the other 
hand, the national program of “building a new socialist countryside” was 
initiated in 2005. The policy framework provides the broad guidelines 
for a state-led transformation of China’s rural areas. Through strategic 
urbanization and land consolidation, “building a new socialist country-
side” aims to sustainably develop rural areas and increase land-use effi-
ciency. Among other things, this includes relocating peasants to concen-
trated urban settlement areas and consolidating scattered village lands for 
commercial development, industrial purposes, and scaled-up agriculture. 
Amidst widespread urbanization of the countryside, quotas for the con-
version of farmland to construction land ensure that the total amount of 
arable land necessary for national grain security does not fall below the 
“red line” of 120 million hectares (463,323 square miles) set by the central 
government.3 
As a result of China’s push for rural urbanization, the demographic 
group of “landless peasants” has emerged. According to official estimates, 
the number of peasants whose land has been expropriated and who have 
been relocated will reach 110 million by the year 2030. Based on my own 
research, the group of landless peasants is defined by one main character-
istic: its members had to give up their land to fulfill government policy 
goals—whether or not they were willing to move and whether or not they 
were still working in agriculture at the time of relocation. The role of land 
is crucial: under China’s persistant rural-urban divide, land provides secu-
rity for people born with rural residency status (hukou) in much the same 
way that social welfare provides security for urban residents. Thus, what 
distinguishes landless peasants from migrant workers—peasants who leave 
behind their land to find urban employment—is that they don’t have the 
safety net of returning to their fields.
Jingzhong Ye, Professor of Development Studies at China Agricultural 
University, points out that peasants’ livelihoods have been secondary to 
resolving issues of land and agriculture throughout the history of the PRC.4 
Still, peasants’ well-being is an important concern in “building a new so-
cialist countryside.” In the official government narrative around the policy 
framework, expropriating peasants and relocating them to concentrated 
residential areas is not only deemed necessary for increasing land-use ef-
ficiency; the government presents the policy as a remedy for a range of 
“rural problems” related to the quality of the countryside and the suzhi 
(human quality) of the peasantry, which still lag behind their urban coun-
terparts. For example, concentrating peasants in urban settlements should 
improve access to education and health care facilities, as well as ameni-
ties like sanitation and running water. Regarding the relocated peasants 
themselves, the program promotes the overall improvement of economic 
and living conditions, guarantees a sustainable livelihood, and essentially 
depicts the move toward a better life. Thus, state-led urbanization advo-
cates regard the policy as a “civilizing” project promising to close China’s 
rural-urban gap.5
If these promises sound too good to be true, it is because they often are. 
Practice has shown that China’s efforts to transform the countryside have 
caused a number of problems for former peasants. Some scholars, such as 
Lynette H. Ong, political scientist and China specialist at the University 
of Toronto, use the term “coercive urbanization” to describe the situation: 
peasants are often forced into giving up their land-use rights and only 
receive inadequate compensation for their losses. Meanwhile, it is wide-
ly known that corrupt local government officials make handsome prof-
its during the process of land transfer. In the urban environment, many 
peasants have trouble finding employment, and the cost of living is high-
er compared to the countryside. Losing the land, which had for centuries 
provided peasants with security, can become a problem if rural residents 
are insufficiently integrated into the urban social welfare system—for ex-
ample, by becoming urban residents on paper without equal access to ur-
ban welfare. Furthermore, village communities are often torn apart, and 
some former peasants face difficulties adapting to their new environments. 
All this has caused social unrest and tensions between the people and the 
state.6
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Huaming Model Town: 
Utopia or Dystopia?
Huaming (see Figure 1) is a suitable case for an-
alyzing narratives of rural urbanization because 
of the attention it received within China and 
abroad during the 2010 World Expo. However, 
apart from its model status, Huaming is far from 
unique. Rather, it is one of countless examples of how “building a new 
socialist countryside” has been implemented in practice. As David Bray, 
senior lecturer in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the 
University of Sydney, reports, thousands of similar projects have emerged 
throughout rural China in recent years. In fact, every administrative village 
in China has been required to commission a twenty-year “master plan” for 
redevelopment.7
Huaming was China’s first national implementation site for the land 
consolidation method “exchanging homestead for house.” Starting around 
2006, peasants from twelve villages, almost 60,000 people, had to relin-
quish their land and rural homesteads, and were subsequently relocated 
to the newly built town (see Figure 2). All households were compensated 
for the loss of their rural dwellings with apartments in Huaming, with a 
baseline of thirty square meters per capita. The reactions of the relocated 
peasants I interviewed varied depending upon individual subjective esti-
mates of gains and losses compared to their former locales. Furthermore, 
peasants were compensated for the loss of the land as a source of income 
and security with a monetary lump sum of 100,000 RMB per capita, about 
$15,000 USD. My informants considered this sum inadequate given the 
actual value of the land and the increased living expenses in an urban 
environment. Also, former peasants were converted to urban citizenship 
status, meaning they were integrated into Tianjin’s basic urban social secu-
rity system, which includes minimum subsistence allowance, basic health 
insurance, and basic pensions for the elderly. The problem of qualifying 
peasants for urban employment was supposed to be solved through re-
training programs, about which none of the people with whom I talked 
were familiar.8
Urban planners have created a functional living environment in Hua-
ming. Most of the town consists of neighborhood compounds for the re-
settled villagers, where people from the same village often still live in close 
proximity to each other. There is a big park and lots of communal space; 
facilities such as a hospital and schools (including a middle school); space 
for commercial development like malls, restaurants, and karaoke bars; 
and convenient infrastructure. Adjacent, there is an industrial park and 
a growing sector of commercial housing with urban middle-class stan-
dards. About ten years after relocation, a new normal has settled in, and 
Huaming’s landless peasants have, for better or for worse, adapted to their 
changed circumstances.
In 2010, Huaming was presented at the World Expo in Shanghai as an 
example of successful rural urbanization. The Huaming pavilion was lo-
cated in the expo’s “urban best practices area,” which displayed innovative 
solutions to problems related to urbanization and urban living. Fitting the 
expo’s overarching theme “better city, better life,” the slogan “same land, 
different life” was chosen for Huaming, and a whole narrative has been 
constructed around the town. Huaming was built on the same land that 
had once belonged to the villagers. The slogan’s intended meaning is that 
on this same land, the relocated peasants are now leading better lives than 
before. This narrative has been propagated throughout the model town’s 
existence, but especially in the time surrounding the expo, when it provid-
ed a red thread for the expo pavilion and all related media coverage.
The official narrative juxtaposes life in the former villages with life in 
Huaming. Village life is depicted as dirty, backward, and disorderly, Huam-
ing is portrayed as the fulfillment of villagers’ long-held dreams of a good 
life and urban planners’ visions for good city living. The lives of Huaming’s 
residents are described as having drastically improved, with some former 
peasants even becoming rich overnight due to the generous compensa-
tions.9 The corresponding imagery is clear: for example, right behind the 
pavilion’s entrance is an archway bearing the slogan “same land, different 
Figure 2: Display map showing the twelve villages that people were relocated from to the new 
centrally located town of Huaming. Source: From Huaming’s management committee conference center.  
Photo courtesy of the author.
Figure 1: Map of China with inset of Tianjin and location of 
Huaming. Source Affordable Housing Institute blog at  
https://tinyurl.com/ydapogut.
According to official estimates, the 
number of peasants whose land has 
been expropriated and who have 
been relocated will reach 110 million 
by the year 2030.
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life,” which offers a view of the “wall of smiling faces” (see Figure 3). On 
it, you can see a slideshow of smiling former rural dwellers, where, upon 
closer inspection, each image consists of thousands of tiny smiling faces.
 In contrast, Western (and overseas Chinese) investigative journalism 
has painted a truly dystopic image of the model town. Here, the narrative 
has been reversed: what was presented as a project benefiting the people 
has turned out to be a scam, and the former peasants are now living under 
precarious conditions. A newspaper clipping from an article in The New 
York Times (see Figure 4) gives an impression of the gloomy tenor in which 
the situation in Huaming is described.
Besides unemployment, disrupted community structures, and frequent 
suicides, the article also includes descriptions of the use of extreme coercion 
by local government, instances of corruption, poor building quality, fertile 
land supposed to be consolidated for important purposes now laying bare, 
major discontent, and a general feeling of despair among the people.10
As one should expect, the official Chinese narrative has painted an 
entirely positive image of Huaming, leaving out any flaws. It is surprising, 
though, that Western journalism has painted an equally biased, entirely 
negative image, neglecting anything positive about the model town.
A more differentiated picture is only painted by some Chinese stud-
ies: the authors stress the model town’s overall accomplishments, but in 
order to provide suggestions for policy improvement, they have been able 
to point out some important issues (for example, rights violations in the 
process of relocation, as well as people’s difficulties in earning a livelihood). 
However, these studies only provide a general, top-down view of the situa-
tion in Huaming, which leaves open the question of how the model town’s 
residents themselves evaluate urbanization. Against this backdrop, the fol-
lowing analysis gives a glimpse into people’s own narratives.
“Same Land, Different Life”: Three Interpretations 
Based on Landless Peasants’ Own Narratives 
The data for this study stems from two stages of ethnographic fieldwork in 
Huaming. My research followed a Grounded Theory design11 with a com-
bination of participant observation and semi-narrative interviews. The 
initial phase of fieldwork, from October to November 2016, allowed me to 
gain an unbiased understanding of the field, establish many contacts, and 
most importantly build trust to lay the foundations for a longer research 
stay. The second time, I lived among the locals for half a year (from Sep-
tember 2017 to February 2018), continuing to do participant observation 
and conducting twenty-five semi-narrative interviews, mostly with infor-
mants with whom I had established closer relationships. Since people knew 
I was not affiliated with the government and that I would protect their 
privacy, they talked to me very openly.
In the course of my fieldwork, I realized that Huaming’s landless peas-
ants share no uniform urbanization experience. Consequently, there are 
no uniform narratives about urbanization. Breaking down my informants’ 
narratives in a simplified manner, the model town’s slogan “same land, dif-
ferent life” can be interpreted in three ways.
(1) Different = Better
During my fieldwork, I was surprised to find that there actually are peo-
ple whose own experiences and opinions correspond to Huaming’s official 
narrative. For these people, moving to Huaming, in one way or the other, 
was the fulfillment of a dream, and they only speak positively about life-
style changes.
One example is a forty-year-old woman, known to everyone as “Sec-
ond Sister,”12 who runs a small family restaurant that she opened when 
she was still living in the countryside. She is the only one who, during our 
interview, actually brought up the slogan “same land, different life” in its 
intended meaning. Narrating her life for me, she told me how she had 
been eager to move to Huaming from the moment the project was first 
announced. Impatiently waiting for her family’s turn to relocate, she envied 
Figure 3: “Wall of smiling faces.” Slideshow right behind the entryway of Huaming’s expo pavil-
ion, visualizing the official narrative of the model town. Source: Photo courtesy of the author.
Figure 4: Newspaper clipping illustrating the tenor of the Western narrative about Huaming. 
Source: The New York Times at http://nyti.ms/17Ljhwh.
Regardless of subjective evaluations 
of urbanization, the Chinese govern-
ment’s actions have had profound 
consequences—both positive  
and negative—for the relocated  
population.
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people who had been allotted earlier moving dates. Talking about herself, 
Second Sister recounted how she had always loved cleanliness and order, 
which for her was embodied in urban living. She is completely satisfied 
with how life in Huaming has turned out and especially loves the beautiful 
landscaping.
Another example is Mr. and Mrs. Ai, a retired couple who had always 
been among the poorest peasants, tilling the land for almost nothing in re-
turn. Even though they had not dreamed of urban living before, the move to 
Huaming eventually provided them with an escape from life on the poverty 
line.
 (2) Different = Worse
In contrast to the above, I also encountered some people who hold a very 
negative image of Huaming, similar to the one painted by investigative 
journalism. Interestingly, some of the people with the most critical views 
on Huaming are not necessarily among those who are currently in the worst 
circumstances. Rather, independently of their own situations, they are con-
cerned for the livelihoods of others and the greater good of social justice.
An example is forty-two-year-old Mr. Ge, who keeps a wary eye on 
the town’s development. Although he is leading a quite comfortable life in 
Huaming—he runs his own small construction business with which he is 
able to provide well for his family—the experience of coercion upon relo-
cation is still ingrained in his mind, and he sees other people struggling to 
make a living on a daily basis. Before our interview, he drove me around 
the edges of town to point out all its flaws: in a nutshell, the villagers were 
forced to cede their land, which corrupt officials had then sold to develop-
ers for a multiple of what people had received as compensation. Much of 
this land was still laying bare before the former peasants’ eyes, while many 
were struggling to make ends meet. According to Mr. Ge, the whole town is 
a lie and a bubble. In his opinion, nothing was done right, and malpractices 
came at the expense of people’s livelihoods.
 (3) Different = Different
The majority of people I came across, however, acknowledge the positive 
and the negative sides of having been urbanized. For them, life is not nec-
essarily better or worse than before, just different. To give one example: 
When I first introduced myself to seventy-three-year-old Laoda and told 
him I was researching Huaming’s urbanization, he nodded knowingly and 
started telling me his thoughts—there were advantages as well as disad-
vantages. For rhetorical purposes, he asked, “What are the disadvantages?,” 
and answered right away, “We don’t have land anymore. What are peasants 
without land supposed to do? How are they supposed to spend their days?” 
This refers not only to difficulties in finding employment for the work-
ing-age population, but also to the loss of purpose many old peasants are 
experiencing. Laoda himself, although already retired, has found varying 
occupations time and again because he says it keeps him fit mentally and 
physically. Currently, he works as a cleaner for a local company. After a 
pause, Laoda posed the same rhetorical question about the advantages of 
being relocated to Huaming. According to him, everyone now owns an 
apartment, even poor peasants who didn’t own property before. Also, old 
people receive a monthly pension, and there is some health insurance—
benefits they did not enjoy as rural residents.
Many more examples could be given, but these few suffice to show how 
landless peasants’ own narratives put into perspective the big narratives 
about them. However, one question remains: why are there such big dis-
crepancies in people’s experiences and narratives regarding urbanization? 
The answer is simple: experiences and narratives differ because landless 
peasants are not a homogeneous demographic group, even though they are 
almost always depicted as such. Rather, people of different socioeconomic 
circumstances, with different life trajectories, dreams, and ideas of a good 
life, all fall under this classification. Depending on the individual and a 
range of factors pertaining to his or her personal situation, urbanization 
has impacted life in different ways, and narratives diverge accordingly.
Conclusion
Ethnographic fieldwork among Huaming’s landless peasants revealed that 
there are indeed people who corroborate the dominant narratives—both 
good and bad—about the model town. However, and more importantly, 
it revealed that there is a large gray area in between that most accurately 
reflects most people’s opinions—i.e., while life in the new environment cer-
tainly is different than before, urbanization has brought about both posi-
tive and negative consequences. Furthermore, my findings highlight that, 
contrary to popular belief, landless peasants are not a homogeneous social 
group, which explains the substantial differences in people’s experiences 
and narratives.
These results are a first step toward closing the research gaps regarding 
our understanding of the role of urbanization for China’s landless peasants. 
However, they merit a further discussion with regard to the wider context 
of China’s state-led urbanization on the one hand and the narrative con-
struction of reality on the other hand.
Regardless of subjective evaluations of urbanization, the Chinese gov-
ernment’s actions have had profound consequences—both positive and neg-
ative—for the relocated population. This first of all raises the question of 
legitimacy: is it legitimate for the state to expropriate peasants and deprive 
them of the land that had for centuries sustained them? The answer is le-
gally yes: under the PRC’s system of land ownership, the government does 
have the right to lawfully requisition land “in the public interest.” Although 
Western governments also have eminent domain authority to expropriate 
land for the public good with appropriate compensation, it is important for 
students to understand that policy implementation is much more contro-
versial in the West because of different traditions regarding ownership and 
individual property rights that are not, for the most part, factors in Chi-
nese history. In China, the general legitimacy of the state to expropriate land 
is not questioned, although people frequently criticize and demonstrate 
against unlawful implementation on lower levels of the state’s hierarchy.13 A 
second important question, although outside the scope of this article, asks 
Figure 5: A man contemplates the slogan “same land, different life” on the boulder at the en-
trance of Huaming’s wetlands park while another man drives by. Source: Photo courtesy of the author.
The majority of people I came across, 
however, acknowledge the positive 
and the negative sides of having been 
urbanized . . . life is not necessarily 
better or worse than before, just  
different.
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what responsibilities the Chinese government should assume toward relo-
cated people. 
Under the premise of the legitimacy of the government’s actions, a 
third question arises: diverse reactions notwithstanding, is Huaming’s re-
located population better off than before? This is a question that cannot 
easily be answered. In material terms, it is possible to argue that the land 
the peasants lost probably held more value than the lump sum of 100,000 
RMB per capita and the state welfare they are now entitled to or that the 
apartment a household received as compensation is worth less (or may-
be more) than the former homestead. On a subjective level that includes 
personal feelings or values that determine happiness, or the lack thereof, 
objective judgments are difficult, or impossible, to make.
 Undeniably, Huaming has seen many instances of local government 
malpractice and still faces many problems. But in contrast to municipal 
and local officials’ even more severe neglect of rural people in other re-
location projects, such as those described by Ong,14 Huaming’s landless 
peasants have been relatively better compensated, and at least their basic 
subsistence is guaranteed. Perhaps Huaming’s residents fared better be-
cause of self-created government incentives incured by naming Huaming 
a “model town.” 
Finally, we should once more consider the dominant narratives about 
Huaming in their own right. Narratives are a powerful tool of constructing 
reality, either purposefully (as is certainly the case in Chinese state me-
dia and propaganda) or unconsciously (as might be the case in Western 
reporting). The predictable utopian official image of Huaming prevails 
within China, while the dystopic image of the model town (or state-led 
relocation projects in general) prevails in the West. Major reasons for these 
contrasting narratives can be ideological, historical, cultural, and even 
market-determined (e.g., what kind of news sells?).15 Besides these factors, 
our own presuppositions also play a role for perpetuating the dominant 
narratives. For example, when journalists go into the field with a bias they 
are not aware of, or with a certain story in mind they know will appeal to 
their readership, they are especially sensitized to picking up on specific 
sentiments and opinions among the people, and may unconsciously dis-
regard other voices.
In conclusion, when learning and thinking about policy outcomes in 
an authoritarian government like the PRC that has the power to create an 
official narrative, it is especially important not to unquestioningly accept 
that narrative. By the same token, however, we should also not unques-
tioningly accept the narratives constructed by Western sources. Further-
more, it is equally as important to question our own presuppositions when 
engaging with a topic. All this might require looking at a subject from a 
worm’s-eye view,16 which means taking into account the lived experiences 
and narratives of the people themselves. ■
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